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Abstract
A generalization of an earlier xed point theorem to a noncompact case is proved and has been applied to prove the
existence of equilibrium points of abstract economies. c© 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In this paper all topological vector spaces will be assumed to be Hausdor. With the aid of our
xed theorem in [11] we have proved the following xed point theorem in [12].
Theorem 1.1. Let X be a nonempty convex subset of a topological vector space. Let T :X ! 2X
be a setvalued mapping such that
(i) for each x 2 X; T (x) is a nonempty convex subset of X ;
(ii) for each y 2 X; T−1(y) = fx 2 X : y 2 T (x)g contains a relatively open set Oy of X (Oy
may be empty for some y);
(iii)
S
x2X Ox = X ; and
(iv) there exists a nonempty set X0X such that X0 is contained in a compact convex subset
X1 of X and the set D =
T
x2X0 O
c
x is empty or compact; where O
c
x denotes the complement
of Ox in X. Then there exists a point x0 2 X such that x0 2 T (x0).
On the other hand, we have proved in [13] the following xed point theorem which is a gener-
alization of our xed point theorem in [11] and is useful in mathematical economics, game theory
and for problems of social sciences:
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Theorem 1.2. Let fX:  2 Ig be a family of nonempty compact convex sets; each in a topological
vector space E; where I is an indexing set. Let X =
Q
2I X. For each  2 I; let T :X ! 2X be
a set valued mapping such that
(i) for each x 2 X; T(x) is a nonempty convex subset of X;
(ii) for each x 2 X; T−1 (x) = fy 2 X : x 2 T(y)g contains a relatively open subset Ox of X
such that[
x2X
Ox = X (Ox may be empty for some x):
Then there exists a point x 2 T (x)=Q2I T(x); i.e.; x 2 T(x) for each  2 I; where P(x)= x
and P is the projection of X onto X.
The object of this paper is to obtain a noncompact version of Theorem 1.2 which will coincide
with Theorem 1.1 when I = f1g and apply this theorem to prove the existence under conditions
similar to those in [13] of a maximal element and an equilibrium point of, respectively, a qualitative
game and an abstract economy which will be shortly described.
Since we intend to apply our xed point theorem to mathematical economics and games, a brief
introduction to the relevant part of these are now in order. Shafer and Sonnenschein [9] extended
the theorem of Debreu on the existence of equilibrium in a generalized N -person game [3] or an
abstract economy [1]. In essence, Shafer and Sonnenschein maintained the spirit of the pioneering
works of Debreu, Arrow [1], Mas-Colell [7] and Gale and Mas-Colell [5,6]. Bewley [2] proved
the existence of equilibrium of an economy with innite dimensional commodity space. In recent
years, many authors (e.g., [10,13{18], etc.) have proved the existence of equilibrium of an abstract
economy with innite dimensional commodity space and innite agents.
Now, following Debreu and Shafer and Sonnenschein we will describe an abstract economy or a
generalized game by E=fX;A;U:  2 Ig. Where I is nite or innite (countable or uncountable)
set of agents or players; and for each  2 I; X is the choice or strategy set; A: X =Q2I X ! 2X is
the constraint correspondence (setvalued mapping) and U :X ! R is the utility or payo function.
For each  2 I; X will be a nonempty subset of a topological vector space. We denote the productQ
2I;  62 X by X− and a generic element of X− by x−.
An abstract economy instead of being given by fX; A; U:  2 Ig may as well be given by
E= fX;A;Q:  2 Ig, where for each  2 I; Q :X ! 2X is the preference correspondence. The
relationship between the preference correspondence Q and the utility function U can be expressed
by the denition
Q(x) = fy 2 X: U([y; x−])>U(x)g;
where for each  2 I; x− is the projection of x onto X− and [y; x−] is the point of X whose th
coordinate is y.
In the case of the economy being given by E= fX;A;U:  2 Ig, a point x 2 X is called an
equilibrium point or a generalized Nash equilibrium point of the economy E if
U(x) = U[x; x−] = sup
z2A(x )
U[z; x−]
for each  2 I where x and x− are, respectively, projections of x onto X and X−. In this case the
equilibrium point is the natural extension of the equilibrium point introducted by Nash [8]. Now, let
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E = fX;A;U:  2 Ig be an abstract economy and let for each  2 I; Q be obtained as above.
Then it can be easily checked that a point x 2 X is an equilibrium point of E if and only if for each
 2 I; Q(x)\ A(x) = and x 2 A(x). Thus given an abstract economy E= fX;Q;A:  2 Ig
we can dene an equilibrium point of E as follows: A point x 2 X is said to be an equilibrium
point of the abstract economy E = fX;Q;A:  2 Ig if for each  2 I; Q(x) \ A(x) =  and
x 2 A(x) where x is the projection of x onto X.
Given an abstract economy E = fX;Q;A:  2 Ig, for each x 2 X we dene I(x) = f 2
I : Q(x) \ A(x) 6= g. Assume that for each x 2 X and for each  2 I; x 62 convex hull of Q(x).
For each  2 I , we dene the set valued mapping T :X ! 2X by
T(x) =
(
co Q(x) \ A(x) if  2 I(x);
A(x) if  62 I(x);
where co Q(x) denotes the convex hull of Q(x).
Then it is easy to see that x 2 X is an equilibrium point of the economy E if and only if x is a
xed point of the set valued mapping T :X ! 2X dened by T (x) =Q2I T(x).
2. Generalized xed point theorem
Theorem 2.1. Let fX:  2 Ig be a family of nonempty convex sets; each in a topological vector
space E; where I is an index set. Let X =
Q
2I X. For each  2 I; let T :X ! 2X be a set valued
mapping such that
(i) for each x 2 X; T(x) is a nonempty convex subset of X;
and
(ii) for each x 2 X; T−1 (x)= fy 2 X : x 2 T(y)g contains a relatively open set Ox of X (Ox
may empty for some x).
() We further assume that for each  2 I; there is a nonempty compact convex subset X^  of
X and a nonempty subset X0 of X^ =
Q
2I X^  such that either; for each  2 I;
(a)
S
x2X Ox = X ;
and
(b) the set D =
T
x2X0 O
c
P(x) = ; where P is the projection of X onto X.
or
(a)0
T
x2X
S
2I O
c
P(x) = ; and
(b)0 D =
T
x2X
S
2I O
c
P(x) is compact if nonempty; where A denotes the closure of A.
Then there is a point x 2 X such that x 2 T (x) = Q2I T(x); i.e. x 2 T(x) for each  2 I;
where P(x) = x for each  2 I .
Before proving the theorem we rst note that the condition (a)0 implies the condition (a). To see
this, suppose (a)0 holds. Then for each
 2 I; Ocx = OcP(x)
[
2I
OcP(x):
Hence
T
x2X O
c
P(x)
T
x2X
S
2I O
c
P(x).
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Thus
S
x2X Ox =
S
x2X OP(x) = [
T
x2X O
c
P(x)]
cX .
Proof. We rst prove the theorem under (a) and (b). Then for each x2 X^ and each  2 I; T(x)\ X^  6=
. Indeed if T(x0)\ X^ = for some x0 2 X^ and some 2 I , then for all x2 X^ ; P(x)= x 62 T(x0),
i.e. x0 62 T−1 (x)Ox . Thus x0 2 [T−1 (x)]cOcx . Hence x0 2
T
x2X0 O
c
P(x) = D as X0 X^ , which
contradicts that D = . Thus for each  2 I , we can dene a set valued mapping T^  : X^ ! 2X^ 
by T^ (x) = T(x) \ X^ ; x 2 X^ . It is easy to see that for each  2 I , and each x 2 X^ ; T^ (x) is
a nonempty convex subset of X^ . Now for each x 2 X^ ; T^−1 (x) = fx 2 X^ : x 2 T^ (x)g = fx 2
X^ : x 2 T(x)\ X^ g= T−1 (x)\ X^ contains a relatively open set Ox \ X^ = O^x in X^ . Also since for
each  2 I , Tx2X0 OcP(x) = , we have Sx2X0 OP(x) = X and hence Sx2X OP(x) = X . Thus for each
 2 I;Sx2X^ O^P(x) = Sx2X^ (OP(x) \ X^ ) = X^ . Hence by Theorem 1.2, there is a point x 2 X^ such that
x 2 T^ (x) =Q2I T^ (x)Q2I T(x) = T (x). Thus we have proved the theorem in this case.
Now we prove the theorem under condition (a)0 and (b)0. In this case we will prove the theorem
by contradiction. If possible, we assume that T =
Q
2I T has no xed point. For each x 2 X , we
set F(x) =
S
2I O
c
P(x). Then under our assumption F(x) 6=  for each x 2 X . For, indeed F(x) = 
for some x 2 X implies x 62 F(x), i.e. x 62 OcP(x) for all  2 I , i.e. x 2 OP(x)T−1 (P(x)) for  2 I ,
i.e. P(x) 2 T(x) for all  2 I , i.e. x 2 T (x) which contradicts our assumption. More generally, the
convex hull of each nite subset fx1; x2; : : : ; xng of X is contained in the union Sni=1 F(xi). To see
this let x =
Pn
i=1 ixi 62
Sn
i=1 F(xi) for nite subset fx1; x2; : : : ; xng of X with i>0 and
Pn
i=1 i = 1.
This implies that for each i= 1; 2; : : : ; n; x 62 F(xi) =S2I OcP(xi), i.e. x 2 OP(xi)T−1 (P(xi)) for all
 2 I , i.e. P(xi) 2 T(x) for all  2 I . But since T(x) is convex, we conclude that P(x) 2 T(x)
for all  2 I (note that Pni=1 iP(xi) =Pni=1 P(ixi) = P(x)). This means that x is a xed point
of T . Thus we have a contraction.
Next, we prove that for each nite subset fx1; x2; : : : ; xng of X;Tx2K F(x) 6= , where K is the
convex hull of X^ [ fx1; x2; : : : ; xng. If possible, let us assume that Tx2K F(x) = . Then for each
y 2 K , the set H (y) = fx 2 K : y 62 F(x)g is a nonempty subset of K . Now for each  2 I , we
dene a set valued mapping H :K ! 2K by H(y) = fP(x) 2 K: y 62 OcP(x)g, where P(K) = K.
Since H (y) 6= , there exists x 2 K such that y 62 F(x). Hence y 62 OcP(x) and P(x) 2 K.
Thus H(y) 6= . Now for each P(x) 2 K; H−1 (P(x)) = fy 2 K : P(x) 2 H(y)g = fy 2
K : y 62 OcP(x)g = OP(x) \ K = OP(x), which is a relatively open set in K . Now for each  2 I ,
we dene a set valued mapping J :K ! 2K by J(y) = convex hull of H(y); y 2 K . Thus for
each y 2 K; J(y) is a nonempty convex subset of K and since J(y)H(y), it follows that for
each P(x) 2 K; J−1 (P(x))H−1 (x) O^P(x) which is a relatively open set in K . FurthermoreT
x2K F(x) =  implies that X =
S
x2K [F(x)]
c =
S
x2K [
T
2I OP(x)], which, in turn, implies X =S
x2K OP(x) =
S
P(x)2K OP(x). Thus K = [
S
P(x)2K OP(x)]\K =
S
P(x)2K [OP(x) \K] =
S
P(x)2K
OP(x).
Hence by Theorem 1.2 there exists a point x 2 K such that P(x) 2 J(x) for each  2 I . This implies
that there exist points y1; y2; : : : ; ym in K such that for each  2 I; P(yi) 2 H(x); i = 1; 2; : : : ; m,
where x =
Pm
i=1 iyi; i>0 and
Pm
i=1 i = 1. This implies that for each i = 1; 2; : : : ; m and each  2
I; x 62 OcP(yi), i.e. for each i = 1; 2; : : : ; m; x 62
S
2I O
c
P(yi) = F(yi). Thus
Pm
i=1 iyi = x 62
Sm
i=1 F(yi)
which contradicts our established fact that the convex hull of each nite subset fy1; y2; : : : ; ymg is
contained in the corresponding union
Sm
i=1 F(yi). Thus we have proved that
T
x2K F(x) 6= . Hence
D\ (Tni=1 F(xi))Tx2K F(x) 6=  as X0 [fx1; x2; : : : ; xngK . What we have then established is that
for each nite subset fx1; x2; : : : ; xng of X;Tni=1(D\F(xi)) 6=  and hence Tni=1(D\F(xi)) 6= . Now
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since by (b)0 D is compact, F(x) \ D is closed for each x 2 X . Hence Tx2X (D \ F(x)) 6=  and,
therefore,
T
x2X F(x) 6=  which contradicts our assumption (a)0.
Thus T =
Q
2I T must have a xed point.
Remark 2.1. (i) If I = f1g, then it can be seen that the above theorem reduces to Theorem 1.1.
(ii) We also note that the above theorem under (a) and (b) contains Theorem 1.2. To see this
let X = X0 in Theorem 1.2. By condition (ii) of Theorem 1.2, we obtain that for each  2 I; D =T
x2X O
c
P(x) = .
(iii) The above theorem under (a)0 and (b)0 can also be proved by the Fan{Knaster{Kuratowski{
Mazurkiewicz theorem [4,12].
3. Fixed point theorem and existence of maximal elements and equilibrium points
In this section we apply our xed point theorem to prove the existence of maximal elements and
equilibrium points of an abstract economy. As in the previous section I will denote an indexing set,
nite or innite, i.e., I is the set of agents.
For each  2 I; X will denote a nonempty set in a topological vector space E; Q :X =Q2I X !
2X a set valued mapping (preference correspondence) and A :X ! 2X a set valued mapping
(constraint correspondence).
fX; Q:  2 Ig will be called a qualitative game and fX; Q; A:  2 Ig and abstract economy.
A point x 2 X is called a maximal element of the game fX; Q:  2 Ig if Q(x)= for each  2 I
and a point x 2 fxg 2 X is called an equilibrium point of the abstract economy fX; Q; A:  2 Ig
if, for each  2 I; x 2 A(x) and Q(x) \ A(x) = .
Theorem 3.1. Let E= fX;Q;A:  2 Ig be an abstract economy such that for each  2 I; the
following conditions hold:
(i) X is convex;
(ii) for each x 2 X; A(x) is nonempty and convex valued;
(iii) for each x 2 X; fQ−1a (x)[Fg\A−1 (x) contains a relatively open set Ox of X; (Ox may
be empty for some x); where F = fx 2 X : Q(x) \ A(x) 6= g.
(iv) for each x = fxg 2 X; x 62 co Q(x);
(v) the condition () of Theorem 2:1 holds with these Ox .
Then E has an equilibrium point.
Proof. For each  2 I , let G = fx 2 X : Q(x) \ A(x) 6= g and for each x 2 X , let I(x) = f 2
I : Q(x) \ A(x) 6= g.
Now for each  2 I , we dene the set valued mapping T :X ! 2X by
T(x) =
(
co P(x) \ A(x) if  2 I(x) i:e:; if x 2 G;
A(x) if ;  62 I(x):
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Then for each x 2 X; T(x) is nonempty and convex valued. Also for each y 2 X, it can be easily
checked that
T−1 (y) = [f(co Q)−1(y) \ A−1 (y)g \ G] [ [A−1 (y) \ F]
 [fQ−1 (y) \ A−1 (y)g \ G] [ [A−1 (y) \ F]
= [Q−1 (y) \ A−1 (y)] [ [F \ A−1 (y)]
= [Q−1 (y) [ F] \ A−1 (y):
The rst inclusion follows from the fact that as Q(x) co Q(x) for each x 2 X;Q−1 (y)
(co Q)−1(y) for each y 2 X. Hence by virtue of condition (iii) for each y 2 X; T−1 (y)
contains an open subset Oy of X . Thus all the conditions of Theorem 2.1 are satised. Hence by
Theorem 2.1 there exists a point x = fxg 2 X such that x 2 T(x) for each  2 I . It follows from
(iv) and denition of T that x is an equilibrium point.
Theorem 3.2. Let  =fX; Q:  2 Ig be a qualitative game such that for each  2 I; the following
conditions hold:
(i) X is convex;
(ii) for each x 2 X; fP−1 (x) [ Fg contains a relatively open subset Ox of X where
F = fx 2 X : Q(x) = g;
(iii) for each x = fxg 2 X; x 62 co Q(x);
(iv) the condition () of Theorem 2:1 holds with these Ox .
Then there is a maximal element of the game  .
Proof. For each  2 I , if we dene the set valued mapping A :X ! 2X by A(x) = X; x 2 X ,
then the theorem will follow from Theorem 3.1.
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